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Abstract—Unlike conventional generators, inverter-based gen-
eration do not possess any rotational inertia. While grid-forming
inverters can synthesize small (virtual) inertia via advanced
feedback control loops, additional control mechanisms are needed
to ensure safety and security of the power grid during transients.
In this paper, we propose novel real-time safety-constrained
feedback controllers (“safety filters”) for droop-based (grid-
forming) inverters to ensure transient security of the grid. The
safety filter acts as a buffer between the network operational
layer and the inverter-control layer, and only lets those dispatch
control signals pass to the inverter droop-controller, which are
guaranteed to not violate the safety specifications (frequency,
voltage, current limits). Using a distributed barrier certificates
method, we construct state-inclusive bounds on the allowable
control inputs, which guarantee the satisfaction of transient safety
specifications. Sum-of-square programming is used to synthesize
the safety filters. Numerical simulation results are provided to
illustrate the performance of the proposed filter in inverter-based
microgrids.
I. INTRODUCTION
Power systems operations today are facing a paradigmatic
shift as solar, wind and other inverter-based energy resources
continue to grow displacing the fossil fueled generators. One
one hand, the distributed nature of these inverter-based re-
sources is driving increased deployment of standalone mi-
crogrids [1], while on the other hand reliability concerns
related to reducing system inertia call for novel control strate-
gies [2]. The emerging ‘grid-forming’ inverter technology
allows the inverters to behave as a controlled voltage source,
as opposed to the conventional controlled current source
(or, ‘grid-following’ mode), enabling standalone operation of
inverter-based microgrids [3], and even synthesizing small
(virtual) inertia. However the lower inertia issues still remain
in inverter-based microgrids. In particular, resulting shrinking
gap in timescales of steady-state (economic) dispatch and
real-time control actions invalidates the traditional temporal
decoupling between various power grid operations [2]. This
fact is recognized in various stability and security-constrained
optimization formulations for microgrids, as exemplified in
[4]–[6] and related works. On the other hand, this has also
spurred the interest in deriving local and distributed stability
conditions for the inverters, specified with respect to its control
parameters [7]–[12], to facilitate the emergence of plug-and-
play operations in microgrids and distribution networks [13],
[14]. Unlike stability and stabilization, the concept of safety
violations of node voltages, line currents and frequencies,
especially during transients, leading to severe power quality
issues and possible damages to the electrical equipment [5],
[15] have been largely ignored in the literature. While sta-
bilization refers to steering the power system to (or, close
to) its operating point after a disturbance, the concept of
safety control implies keeping this system away from poor
(and damaging) operating conditions, e.g. avoiding violations
of voltage and frequency limits.
The concept of safety control falls under the broader
category of constrained control methods, such as the model
predictive control [16], reference governors [17], [18] and
barrier functions based methods [19], [20]. As opposed to
the traditional optimization-based model predictive control
and reference governor methods, the work presented in this
paper is more aligned with approaches based on the (control)
barrier functions (as in [20]–[22]) and the explicit reference
governors [18] which guarantee safety via forward invariance
of some (safe) set. In particular, such methods allow synthesis
of safe feedback control policies by construction of appropri-
ate (control) barrier functions which satisfy certain algebraic
conditions guaranteeing set invariance of safety specifications.
Recent works have started exploring the applications of bar-
rier functions based methods for transient safety analysis of
power systems. In [23], the authors proposed a computational
algorithm for designing safety certificates for an inverter-based
microgrid using sum-of-squares (SOS) algorithms. In [24],
the authors developed an assume-guarantee type contracts for
safety of bulk power systems network. Authors in [25] applied
barrier certificates based analysis for the problem of transient
safety in terms of hierarchical frequency control in bulk power
systems networks.
The main contribution of this paper is in applying barrier
functions based method to identify state-inclusive bounds on
the control inputs, that can ascertain safety of the network
in a distributed manner under uncertainties. In particular, we
envision a hierarchical plug-and-play framework of operation
for the microgrids (similar to [26]) where a microgrid co-
ordinator dispatches active and reactive power control set-
points to the droop-controlled inverters. The droop-controlled
inverters in turn communicate to the microgrid coordinator, a
set of bounds on the control inputs, which guarantee safety
under fluctuations in the network conditions. Closed-form
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expressions are provided to synthesize these safety bounds,
which act like a “safety filter” that allows only the dispatched
set-points that lie within those bounds. Numerical results are
provided to illustrate the use of the safety filters. The rest
of the article is organized as follows: Section II explains the
microgrid model and the describes the problem; Section III
presents the necessary background on barrier functions and
safety certificates. The main computational and algorithmic
developments are described in Section IV, with numerical
results presented in Section V. We conclude the article in
Section VI. Throughout the text, | · | is used to denote both the
Euclidean norm of a vector and the absolute value of a scalar;
and R [x] to denote the ring of all polynomials in x ∈ Rn.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
A. Microgrid Model
We consider the following model of droop-controlled grid-
forming inverter dynamics [8], [23], [27]:
θ˙i = ωi , (1a)
τiω˙i = −ωi + λpi
(
P seti − Pi
)
(1b)
τiv˙i = v
0
i − vi + λqi
(
Qseti −Qi
)
(1c)
where λpi > 0 and λ
q
i > 0 are the droop-coefficients associated
with the active power vs. frequency and the reactive power
vs. voltage droop curves, respectively; τi is the time-constant
of a low-pass filter used for the active and reactive power
measurements; θi , ωi and vi are, respectively, the phase angle,
speed and voltage magnitude; v0i is the desired (nomial)
voltage magnitude; P seti and Q
set
i are the active power and
reactive power set-points, respectively. Finally, Pi and Qi are,
respectively, the active and reactive power injected into the
network which relate to the neighboring bus voltage phase
angle and magnitudes as:
Pi = vi
∑
k∈Ni
vk (Gi,k cos θi,k +Bi,k sin θi,k) (2a)
Qi = vi
∑
k∈Ni
vk (Gi,k sin θi,k −Bi,k cos θi,k) (2b)
where θi,k = θi − θk , and Ni is the set of neighbor nodes.
Gi,k and Bi,k are respectively the transfer conductance and
susceptance values of the line connecting the nodes i and k .
At the equilibrium (steady-state) operation:
∀i : Pi = P seti , Qi = Qseti , ωi = 0, vi = v0i .
The dynamics of the inverters (1) bear some similarities with
the classical swing equation-based models of synchronous
generators, where the time-constant τ resembles the rotational
inertial mass of the conventional generators. The values of
the time-constants are typically orders of magnitude smaller
than the rotational inertial mass. As such, these low-inertial
inverter-based systems are more prone to transient fluctuations
than bulk power grid [5], requiring faster time-scale control
of the microgrid to ensure operational reliability.
In a hierarchical microgrid control architecture (illustrated
in Fig. 1), a microgrid operator (or, coordinator) would be
dispatching the active and reactive power setpoints to the
individual inverters, to achieve certain operational goals (e.g.
loss minimization). The dispatched active and reactive power
set-points can be modeled as:
P seti = P
0
i + u
p
i , Q
set
i = Q
0
i + u
q
i , (3)
where P 0i and Q
0
i are the set-points for the unperturbed
(or nominal) operating condition; and upi and u
q
i are any
deviations from the nominal. Changes in the dispatched control
set-points, in addition to uncertainties and variability in the
network, drive transient fluctuations in the terminal voltage and
frequency which may violate the ‘safety’ limits determined via
engineering design, such as:
vi ≤ vi(t) ≤ vi , ωi ≤ ωi(t) ≤ ωi .
In this paper, we are interested in synthesizing safe set of
possible dispatched set-points of the form:
upi ∈ Upi , uqi ∈ Uqi
such that safety of the voltage and frequency at the terminal of
each inverter is guaranteed robustly under a set of (uncertain)
operating conditions.
B. Safety Filter: Problem Formulation
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the safety filters acting at the individual inverter
terminals blocking out (and modifying) any coordinator dispatched set-points
that are (potentially) unsafe.
In this paper, we are not interested in computing any
particular safety control policies. Instead, we are interested in
identifying a set of allowable control inputs which will ensure
safety of the sub-system under bounded disturbances from the
neighbors. In particular, as illustrated in Fig. 1, we would like
to identify state-inclusive semi-algebraic set of the form:
Ui(xi) := {u |Ui(xi, u) ≤ 0} (4)
where Ui(·) is a set of polynomials in xi and u , such that the
safety of the sub-system is guaranteed for every control input
ui ∈ Ui(xi) whenever the disturbances from the neighbor are
norm-bounded. In this particular case, we will use the barrier
level-sets (Bj(xj) ≥ cj), introduced in Sec. III, as a proxy for
the norm-bounds on the neighbor states (xj), but the results
hold for any other types of norm-bounds.
III. BACKGROUND
A. Safety Certificates: Barrier Functions
Consider a nonlinear dynamical system of the form
x˙(t) = f(x(t)) ∀t ≥ 0 , x ∈ Rn , (5)
with an equilibrium at the origin (f(0) = 0), where f : Rn →
Rn is locally Lipschitz. For brevity, we would drop the argu-
ment t from the state variables, whenever obvious. In contrast
to asymptotic stability which concerns with the convergence
of the state variables to the stable equilibrium, the notion of
‘safety’ comes from engineering design specifications. From
the design perspective, the system trajectories are not supposed
to cross into the certain regions in the state-space marked as
‘unsafe’. Let us assume that the ‘unsafe’ region of operation
for the system (5) is given by the domain
Xu := {x ∈ Rn |wi(x) > 0 , i = 1, 2, . . . , l} (6)
where wi : Rn 7→ R are a set of l (≥ 1) polynomials. Safety
of such systems can be verified through the existence (or,
construction) of continuously differentiable barrier functions
B : Rn 7→ R of the form [19]–[22]:
B(x) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ Rn\Xu (7a)
B(x) < 0 ∀x ∈ Xu (7b)
(∇xB)Tf(x) + α (B(x)) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ Rn (7c)
where α(·) is an extended class-K function1. The third condi-
tion ensures that at the level-set B = 0 the value of the barrier
function is increasing along the system trajectories. Safety
is guaranteed for all trajectories starting inside the domain
{x |B(x) ≥ 0} which is invariant under the dynamics (5).
B. Sum-of-Squares (SOS) Optimization
A multivariate polynomial p ∈ R [x] , x ∈ Rn, is a sum-
of-squares (SOS) polynomial if there exist some polynomial
functions hi(x), i = 1 . . . s such that p(x) =
∑s
i=1 h
2
i (x). We
denote the ring of all SOS polynomials in x by Σ[x]. The
problem of determining whether or not a given polynomial is
an SOS can be cast into an equivalent semi-definite problem
[29]. An important result from algebraic geometry, called Puti-
nar’s Positivstellensatz theorem [30], [31], helps in translating
conditions such as in (7) into SOS feasibility problems.
Theorem 1: Let K= {x ∈ Rn | k1(x) ≥ 0 , . . . , km(x) ≥ 0}
be a compact set, where kj are polynomials. Define k0 = 1 .
Suppose there exists a µ ∈
{∑m
j=0σjkj |σj ∈Σ[x]∀j
}
such
that {x ∈ Rn| µ(x) ≥ 0} is compact. Then,
p(x)>0 ∀x∈K =⇒ p∈
{∑m
j=0
σjkj |σj ∈Σ[x]∀j
}
.
Remark 1: Using Theorem 1, one can translate the problem
of checking that p> 0 on K into an SOS feasibility problem
where we seek the SOS polynomials σ0 , σj ∀j such that p−∑
j σjkj is SOS. Note that any equality constraint ki(x) = 0
1A continuous function α : (−a, b) 7→ (−∞,∞) , for some a, b > 0 , is
extendend class-K if it is strictly increasing and α(0) = 0 [28].
can be expressed as two inequalities ki(x)≥ 0 and ki(x)≤0.
In many cases, especially for the ki ∀i used throughout this
work, a µ satisfying the conditions in Theorem 1 is guaranteed
to exist (see [31]), and need not be searched for.
C. Distributed Barrier Certificates
An interconnected network model of the microgrid with m
droop-controlled inverters can be compactly expressed as:
x˙i = fi(xi) + gi(xi)ui +
∑
j∈Ni
hij(xi, xj) , (8a)
Xu,i := {xi |wj(xi) ≥ 0 , j = 1, 2, . . . , li} (8b)
where each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} identifies an inverter. xi ∈ Rni
is the ni-dimensional state vector associated with the i-th
inverter, while ui is an ri-dimensional control input vector.
We assume that the origin is an operating point of interest of
the networked system. We assume that hij(xi, 0) = 0 for all
xi . Moreover fi, gi and hij are locally Lipschitz functions.
In a recent work [23], a design procedure was presented to
compute state-feedback control policies that guarantee safety
of the inverter-based microgrids via distributed barrier certifi-
cates as summarized in the following result:
Theorem 2: [23] If there exist continuous functions Bi(xi) ,
control policies ui and non-negative scalars ci satisfying
∀i : Bi(0) > ci (9a)
Bi(xi) < 0 ∀xi ∈ Xu,i (9b)
B˙i ≥ 0 ∀xi ∈ ∂Di[ci], ∀xj ∈ Dj [cj ] ∀j ∈ Ni (9c)
B˙i = ∇xiBTi (fi(xi) + gi(xi)ui +
∑
j∈Ni
hij(xi, xj)) .
where Di[ci] := {xi |Bi(xi) ≥ ci} ∀i and ∂Di[ci] :=
{xi |Bi(xi) = ci} is the boundary set of the domain Di[ci] .
then the safety of the interconnected system (8) is guaranteed
for all t ≥ 0 whenever Bi(xi(0)) ≥ ci ∀i , i.e.
xi(0) ∈ Di[ci] ∀i =⇒ xi(t) ∈ Rni\Xu,i ∀i ∀t ≥ 0 .
Moreover there is a neighborhood Xi around origin (i.e. 0 ∈
Xi ∀i) such that Xi ⊆ Di[ci] .
SOS based techniques were used in [22], [23] to compute
the barrier functions for each isolated and autonomous sub-
system of the form: x˙i = fi(xi) , satisfying the conditions in
(7). The set Di[0] = {x |Bi(x) ≥ 0} is an invariant subset
of the safety region of the isolated subsystem i . Moreover, a
feedback control policy that satisfied the safety conditions can
be computed by solving an optimization problem similar to:
∀i : min
ui(xi)
u¯i (10a)
s.t. ‖ui(xi)‖∞ ≤ u¯i ∀xi ∈ Di[c] , (10b)
and
{ ∇xiBTi (fi + giui +∑j∈Nihij) ≥ 0
∀xi ∈ ∂Di[ci] , ∀xj ∈ Dj [cj ], j ∈ Ni (10c)
IV. SAFETY FILTER DESIGN: MAIN RESULTS
Consider the interconnected network described by (8),
where each isolated and autonomous subsystem-i of the form
x˙i = fi(xi) admits a barrier function Bi(xi), satisfying the
conditions in (7), such that the domain Di[0] is an invariant
subset of the safety region specified for the isolated subsystem
i. Moreover, for convenience, each of the subsystem barrier
functions are scaled so that Bi(0) = 1∀i . As such, in this
section, we will concern ourselves with the bounded region of
the interconnected network of the form:
D1[c1]×D2[c2]× · · · × Dm[cm]
for some ci ∈ [0, 1) . We can state the following results:
Proposition 1: Consider subsystem-i of the interconnected
system (8). If
∣∣∇BTi gi∣∣>0 on the boundary set ∂Di[ci] , then,
under bounded disturbances from the neighbors j ∈ Ni of the
form xj ∈ Dj [cj ], there exists a state-feedback control policy
for subsystem-i such that Di[ci] is an invariant domain.
Proof Let us select ui=βigTi ∇Bi for some
βi ≥ max
xi∈∂Di[c],xj∈Dj [c]
∣∣∣∇BTi (fi +∑j∈Nihij)∣∣∣∣∣∇BTi gi∣∣2 .
By construction, this ui satisfies the condition (10c), thereby
guaranteeing invariance of the domain Di[ci].
Proposition 2: Consider subsystem-i of the interconnected
system (8). If u∗i is some state-feedback control policy which
guarantees invariance of Di[ci] under bounded disturbances
from the neighbors j ∈ Ni of the form xj ∈ Dj [cj ], then so
does a family of state-feedback control policies of the form
{u∗i + βgTi ∇Bi |β≥0} .
Proof This follows trivially when we notice that for every
feedback control policy u∗i satisfying (10c), any feedback
policy u∗i + βg
T
i ∇Bi , for arbitrary β≥0 , also does so.
While the above results are obtained without any consid-
eration of possible bounds on the control inputs, in practice
there are finite limits on the control inputs that can be applied.
Assuming that there exists a safety feedback control policy u∗i
which satisfies the bounds on the control inputs, we can find a
βmax > 0 such the family of safety feedback control policies
{u∗i + βgTi ∇Bi |β ∈ [0, βmax]}
will generate control inputs satisfying the control bounds.
Therefore we can construct a state-inclusive semi-algebraic
set of the form (4) with a vector of polynomials:
Ui(xi, u) = ((u
∗
i (xi)−u)
(
u∗i +β
maxgTi ∇Bi−u
)
, (11)
where the symbol  represents component-wise multiplica-
tion, such that whenever a control input ui(t) chosen (arbi-
trarily) from the set Ui(xi(t)) , i.e.
∀t : ui(t) ∈ Ui(xi(t)) , (12)
the invariance of the domain Di[ci] is guaranteed under
bounded disturbances, xj ∈ Dj [cj ] , from the neighbors. Note
that, for polynomial barrier functions that are quadratic or
higher order polynomials, we have ∇Bi(0) = 0 , i.e., by
construction, the semi-algebraic set (11) leads to sector-like
bounds on the control input.
However, such sector-like bounds are too restrictive. The
reason is that the semi-algebraic set theoretic condition (10c),
used to construct (11), yields a control policy that needs to
be activated only close to the boundary of the set defined by
Di[ci], a subset of the safety region. As such, a safety control
set defined in the form of (4), with Ui defined in (11), would
invariably lead to unnecessarily restricted set of safe control
inputs, especially close to the origin. This is circumvented in
the following construction of safety control bounds:
Theorem 3: Consider subsystem-i of the network (8). If∣∣∇BTi gi∣∣ > 0 on the boundary set ∂Di[ci] , then there exist
state-feedback control policies uαi (xi) and u
θ
i (xi), satisfying
uαi (xi)<u
θ
i (xi) (strict vector inequality) everywhere in Di[ci],
such that the family of state-feedback control policies
ui(xi) ∈
{
r uαi (xi) + (1− r)uθi (xi) | r ∈ [0, 1]
}
guarantees invariance of Di[ci] under bounded disturbances
from the neighbors, xj ∈ Dj [cj ]∀j ∈ Ni .
Proof Recall that the Propositions 1 and 2 combine to show
the existence of sector-like bounds for safety control inputs
given in the form of (4) with Ui(xi, u) given by (11). Now,
note that we can use the properties of the barrier functions to
expand the allowable safety control set as:
Ui(xi) :=
{
u
∣∣∣∣Ui(xi, u)≤γ log( 1−ci1−Bi(xi)
)}
, (13)
where γ is a positive scalar termed as the ‘relaxation coeffi-
cient’, and Ui is defined in (11). Observe that the right-hand
side of the inequality is non-negative inside the domain Di[ci],
with it approaching zero at the boundary ∂Di[ci] and infinity
at the origin. The quadratic inequality can be solved to obtain
a family of safety control inputs,
{u |uαi (xi) ≤ u ≤ uθi (xi)}
guaranteeing the invariance of Di[ci] under bounded neighbor
disturbances xj ∈ Dj [cj ]∀j ∈ Ni . Moreover, it can be
shown that (detailed omitted), the vector difference ∆u(xi) :=
uθi (xi) − uαi (xi) , is proportional to the component-wise
square-root of the term
(βmax)
2
(gi∇Bi)2 + 4γ log
(
1−ci
1−Bi(xi)
)
where the first term denotes component-wise square. Second
term is zero only at the boundary ∂Di[ci]. But, as per assump-
tion,
∣∣∇BTi gi∣∣ > 0 on the boundary set ∂Di[ci] . Therefore
∆u(xi) > 0 everywhere inside Di[ci] .
Note that the safety control set (13) in Theorem 3 can be
recast into (4) by modifying the definition of Ui in (11).
Theorem 3 provides an algebraic condition that can be easily
checked to verify whether a dispatched control input is safe or
not, using only locally available information (such as the states
belonging to the subsystem-i alone). This contrasts with the
other alternative methods, such as solving a semi-algebraic set
condition similar to the one in (10c) which requires solving
an equivalent, and non-trivial, semi-definite optimization, to
verify safety guarantees under a control policy, or requires
information from neighboring subsystems in order to verify
safety under a dispatched control input.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We consider the microgrid example used in [23], which was
modified from the network described in [32]. Specifically, we
disconnect the utility and replace the substation (bus 0) by
a droop-controlled inverter, with three other inverters placed
on buses 1, 4 and 5 . Inverter dynamics were modeled in
the form of (1). Bus 0 was considered as the reference bus
for the phase angle. The droop coefficients λpi and λ
q
i were
selected as 2.43 rad/s/p.u. and 0.2 p.u./p.u., respectively; while
the filter time-constant τi was set to 0.5 s [8]. Nominal values
of voltage and frequency, as well as the active and reactive
power set-points were obtained by solving the steady-state
power-flow equations (2), which were then used to shift the
nominal operating point to the origin. The loads were modeled
as constant power loads, and a Kron reduced network with
only the inverter nodes were used for analysis. The unsafe set
was defined in terms of the shifted (around the 1 p.u.) nodal
voltage magnitudes as vi < −0.4 p.u. or vi > 0.2 p.u. In this
paper, we focus only on the transient voltage safety limits, but
other safety limits (such as frequency, phase angle difference,
etc.) can be formulated as well.
Barrier functions are computed for each isolated and au-
tonomous system using the algorithm described in [22], [23].
An optimization problem similar to (10) is solved to compute
a control policy u∗i (x) that guarantees the invariance of the
domains defined by the barrier level-sets ci = 0 ∀i . Then the
bounds of the control inputs are computed for each subsystem
using the closed-form expressions proposed in (13). Fig. 2
illustrates the obtained state-inclusive bounds on the allowable
safe control inputs. The first two sub-plots show the safe values
of reactive power control input, as a function of the voltage
deviation (while frequency deviation is kept at zero, i.e. a
projection) for various values of β and γ . The third sub-plot
shows the volume of the state-space over which the control
input uq = 0 is deemed to be ‘safe’, for various values of
γ, with β = 1 . In order to illustrate the effect of the sector-
bounds, we show the time-series simulations of two scenarios.
The subsystem 3 results are presented in Fig. 3. Uncertainties
are created by randomly sampling the neighboring states (xj)
from the set Dj [0] . The top plots shows that without any
safety filter, the voltage trajectories violate the safety bounds
when the dispatched set-point is uqi = 0. The bottom two plots
show the safety filter is active with the control bounds, with
(β, γ)=(1, 100), and the voltage stays within the safety limits.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we consider the problem of safety in inverter-
based microgrids. Using barrier functions based methods, we
introduce the notion of a safety filter which acts like a buffer
between higher level control set-points and the device-level
controller. We propose a method to synthesize easy-to-evaluate
state-inclusive bounds on the allowable (safe) control inputs.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the state-inclusive bounds on the safety control inputs
for the inverter 3: (a) We keep γ = 0 and vary β. (b) We keep β = 1 and
vary γ. (c) We keep β = 1 and vary γ, and show at which state values the
control input uq = 0 is deemed ‘safe’.
SOS programming was used to design the safety filters in a
distributed manner. Numerical results illustrate the effective-
ness of the concept. Future work will explore the extension of
such methods to larger power systems networks, and explore
the integrated operation of these safety filters in a microgrid
with a heterogeneous collection of DERs.
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